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in prose in Latin. To render by 'sword' therefore, is to mistranslate the original. English has a number of words that belong to poetry to express this idea. In the line—

He is coming! Quick, my falcion!
the Roman word would have been *ensis*. Of course the English does not always have an equivalent that matches the range of the Latin word. Take, for example, Vergil's use of *linquo*. This word does not belong to prose, which uses *relinquo*. The nearest English equivalent 'forsake' is not always the same. Then, too, metre may have its effect. Thus Vergil always uses *propinquo* for *appropinquo* because *appropinquo* is metrically impossible. It is, therefore, a matter of doubt whether Vergil expected *propinquo* to produce a particular effect; unquestionably, however, he did expect *linquo* to produce a special effect. Consequently, one may hesitate to translate *propinquo* by 'draw nigh'. But these as well as other important considerations depend upon the personal equation of the student.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE TEACHING OF GREEK ART¹

Professor Michaelis begins his recent book on the archaeological discoveries of the nineteenth century with the following words: "If the favor of the general public, at least in Germany, toward the close of the last century, has more and more been withdrawn from the study of antiquity, this change of interest has at any rate affected archaeology to a much less degree, for in the domain of ancient art during many decades a succession of noteworthy discoveries has awakened widespread interest".

German conditions are, of course, in many ways different from ours, but the differences are in degree rather than in kind, and this recently formed association is proof enough, if any were needed, that we teachers of Classics are quite aware of the dangers of our position in the face of the withdrawal of public interest in the subjects which are nearest to us. It is perhaps not so clear whether there is to be any compensation or help for this loss of interest in a growing attention on the part of the American public to the artistic side of Greek life, but the outlook here seems to have some distinctly hopeful features: the public press lays much stress on new discoveries; when new objects of Greek art make their appearance in museums, people flock to see them, and our school at Athens, now a quarter of a century old, has grown steadily, if slowly, both in the character of its work and in the influence which it exerts. Is it not possible that in fostering an interest in Greek art we may be not only further-

ing something intrinsically valuable, but may also be thereby lending a helping hand to the general cause of classical study?

Much discussion is going on elsewhere than in our own country concerning the study of Greek art in connection with classical work in schools and colleges. Two years ago at the International Congress at Athens several addresses dealt with various aspects of the problem, such as the proper scope of the work, the education of teachers, methods of illustration, etc. In the older countries there is of course a far larger body of educated opinion to support such study, but we have a right to believe that this may come to us too in time when the days of the present boisterous struggle for private gain are past and the public becomes more inclined not simply to ask for the man who "does things", but to inquire a little more into the value of what he does.

These are, however, days of crowded programmes in schools and colleges. Hence, if the claims of new subjects are urged, these claims call for ample justification, and such justification should rest on a broad and solid foundation. It should be shown, it seems to me, that the new subject is likely to add something of real value to the life of the student, and to bring to him some humanizing influence; it should, in short, be of a nature to add to the happiness and well-being of later life. Is art in general and Greek art, specifically, a subject of this nature? This is indeed a far-reaching topic, for it involves the ethical question of a conception of happiness and the aesthetic question of what art has to do with ethics. These, truly, are matters which I am not qualified to discuss, even if this were the time for such discussion, but it may not be out of place to state briefly a Greek view touching them—I mean specifically Aristotle's—to see if his ideas do not embody a theory which is calculated to suggest to us some real utility in the teaching of Greek art.

I am aware that modern writers on such subjects regard Greek views of ethics and aesthetics as inadequate and in many respects elementary. Perhaps they are, but for all that they contain much practical truth. At this University our philosophers have been of late talking much about "Pragmatism", a theory which, if I understand the recent discussion correctly, tends to regard as true ideas which appear to work under practical application; to me at least Aristotle's ideas seem to respond pretty well to this test. What, then, has he to say about happiness or well-being? Those of you who are familiar with the *Ethics* (a book, by the way, that we classical students do not read half as much as we ought) will remember that the

¹ This paper was presented at the meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle States and Maryland, at New York, April 27, 1907.

opening chapters establish a definition of well-being, *eudaimonia*. All men, declares the philosopher, good and bad alike, seek this desirable thing, but they do not agree about what it really is. There must, however, be some final conception of what this *eudaimonia* is, since it so generally appears to be the *τέλος* or end of man's vital activity, and this conception must be in accord with some idea of excellence (*ἀρετή*), for even our subordinate activities we think of as excellent or the reverse. Furthermore, this idea of excellence, if it is to be applied to the all-embracing activity of life, must have its application to the spiritual element in man, since this is the higher part of his nature. The essence of *eudaimonia*, therefore, is to be found in the soul's activity exercised in accordance with a perfected excellence. Aristotle is, however, not so unpractical as to suppose that the well-being or happiness which is involved in the spiritual activity may not be sadly checked by material conditions that are unfavorable; he does, however, maintain that the essence of *eudaimonia* rests in this purely spiritual view and is not to be found in the subordinate ends which men strive for, such as wealth, position, etc. Thus it may be assumed that under this spiritual view whatever tends to enlarge and enrich a person's thought will tend to promote his happiness and well-being.

According to such a theory, therefore, *eudaimonia* involves an ethical activity, since it calls for an activity which is in accordance with perfected excellence (*κατὰ τελείαν ἀρετήν*), and the question therefore at once arises whether the arts are closely enough related to ethics to make their influence contributory to the *ἀρετή* which promotes *eudaimonia*. At this point the Greek theories of ethics enter into the matter.

It is a commonplace truth that the aesthetic feeling and the passion for aesthetic expression were widespread among the Greeks; this is made clear enough even by the character of their industrial art, which so strongly reflects the influence of their great masters. No less, however, is it true that Greek aesthetic theory was imperfectly developed and that the common tendency in Greek writers was to regard art as something which was subordinate to morals and was intended chiefly to serve the cause of moral development, in other words, to hold that art was to instruct and not simply to give pleasure. I suppose no one to-day would defend such a didactic theory of art, but it is found from Plato, that consummate artist, down to Strabo and Plutarch. Nowhere does this view come out more clearly than in Aristophanes, and his writings are especially interesting in this respect, because his appeal is directly to the popular consciousness. He does not attack Euripides primarily because his art

is bad as art, though he clearly believes that it is, but because he deems him a bad teacher of morals.

With Aristotle, however, another and more satisfactory theory of art appears, which no doubt came to be recognized, but which was never characteristic of Greek thought. This theory is not completely worked out by the philosopher, but the general nature of his views may be gathered, especially from the *Poetics*. Aristotle practically abandons the idea that art is didactic; its function, he believes, is to produce an emotional satisfaction and pleasure which is its own. The ethical tendency in works of art is not to be regarded as a sound basis for critical judgment; this should rest rather on the purely aesthetic impression which is produced. Thus in the *Poetics* there is considerable criticism of Euripides, not, however, because his plays have an immoral tendency, but because they are inartistic.

At first sight it might seem that Aristotle's view involves such a shallow theory as is implied in the maxim of "art for art's sake", just as if this manifestation of human emotion and intellect were not intimately bound up with other and paramount interests in man's life, but the philosopher does not appear to have been led astray here. True to Greek tradition the moral element would seem to have entered into his idea in the quality of the aesthetic pleasure demanded. This is perhaps too subjective a view of art to suit some people, for it places the chief emphasis on the emotions of the beholder rather than on the completeness and perfection with which the particular creation of the artist has attained the idea that it embodies. Nevertheless in the long run the artist must make his appeal to the emotions of other human beings, or else his work will become circumscribed and narrow, in a word, practically useless. Thus it would seem to me that Aristotle's views are essentially sound, even though it be granted that they are but imperfectly developed in the works which we possess.

I have alluded to the high quality of aesthetic pleasure which Aristotle's views demand, and through which the ethical element enters into his theory of art. It is just at this point that the contribution of art to man's happiness and well-being is suggested. The high aesthetic pleasure may well be one of the elements to enter into the soul's activity in accordance with perfected excellence, and should thus add its influence toward the attainment of *eudaimonia*.

I believe, therefore, that Aristotle would have said and have said rightly, that the study of art should bring to the student something of real value, and that it is likely to add to the happiness and well-being of his life.

Columbia University JAMES RIGNALL WHEELER
(To be concluded.)